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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UR.\XT ~COTT IIASI~.A~f, 
Plaintiff and Apprllaut, 
YS. 
PI\lTL l~I\lTLSEX, P. ll. PAULSEN, 
and B\rROX P .. \uLSEN, dba AC~IE 
CH.A ~1~ H 11~XT .. \1~ C()~lP .. -\~\T, et al, 




DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS, 
d~ACMECRANERENTALCOMPANY 
ST.A_1.,E~IEXT OF THE N.A.Tl~Rl~ OF THE CASE 
Thi~ is an action for personal injuries which occur-
red during the construction of a new church building. 
DISPOSI~TION IN LO·VVER ICOl .. RT 
... \ftpr a verdict \\Tas returned in favor of the Plain-
tiff and .. A.ppellant, the Lo\Yer Court granted Defendants-
Respondent~, dba .. A ..c1ne Crane Rental Co1npany, a new 
trial. Thereafter, in Case X o. 9935 the Plaintiff and 
Appellant petitioned this court for an Interlocutory Ap-
peal, Case X o. 9935, and on July 30, 1963, this court 
denied the Plaintiff an Interlocutory Appeal. 
In the Lo,ver Court the Defendants-Respondents, 
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dba Ac1ne Crane Rental Co1npany, in addition to a 
1fotion for a K e\\T ~rrial, filed a ~lotion for Re1nittitur of 
Excessive Da1nages and a ~1otion to Btlt Aside the Jury 
'T erdict and ,J udgn1ent thereon. The ne'v trial wa:-; 
granted. The Lo"Ter Court did not and has not ruled on 
the Defendants-Respondents' 1Iotion for a Re1nittitnr 
of Excessive Da1nages and 1Iotion to Set Aside the Jury 
\ ... erdict and Judgment thereon. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendants-Respondents, dba Acme Crane Ren-
tal Company, 'vant this court to affirm again the order 
granting them a ne\\T trial unless this court conc1ndP:-; 
the Lo,ver Court should be instructed to grant a judg .. 
1nent in favor of the Defendants-Respondents, dba ... ~cHH! 
Crane Rental Company, of No Cause of Action, N.O. ·v. 
STATE:.\IENT OF ~IATERIAL :B,ACTS 
The Appellant's State1nent of Facts is inco1nplete 
and merely sho,vs the facts and issues as the Appellant 
contends them to be, and not as they "~ere necessarily 
viewed to be by the trial court. 
At about 1:00 P.l\I. on January 19, 1960, the Plain-
tiff 'vas injured during the course of the construction 
of the :.\Iontunent Park Stake House near ,, ... asatch Boule-
vard and 13th South in Salt r~ake City, lTtah (R. 241-
2±2). The niontunent Park Stake House is located near 
the intersection of .,, ... asatch Boulevard and 13th South 
in Salt Lake 'City, Utah. At the time of the accident, the 
Plaintiff had had seven years experience driving a 
ready-mix sand and gravel truck (R. :2-±0). Exhibit 2-D, 
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u diagratn, ~ho\vs generally the loeation of the po\verlines 
in rPlation~hip to the concrete pour \vhich took place on 
.J unuary 19, 1960. Exhibits 23-D and 26-D sho'v the 
po\rPrlines at the job site as of .A.pril 4, 1963. In the 
uppPr lPfthand eorner of Exhibit 2-D, Scott Hasla1n drew 
a ero~8 \vith a circle (R. 242, 2-±3) to indicate \Yhere he 
~topped his truck and \Vaited to unload it. He waited 
nbout ten or fifteen 1ninutes to unload the truck ( R. 243). 
~eott llaslatn neYPr sa\v the po,verline or the poles (R. 
:!47) prior to the accident. The weather was cold and 
eloudy, but it \vas not stor1ny (R. 249). \Vhile \vaiting 
to unload his truck, the Plaintiff didn't get out of the 
truck. lie stated there was no need to get out and look 
around (R. 2-!9). Prior to the accident he had made hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of deliveries of ready-mix to job 
~itP~ (R. :27 4). 
\Vhen ~lr. Haslam arrived at the job site, he drove 
in from 13th South in a southerly direction and turned 
his truck around so it faced north (R. 275 ). He made no 
exrunination of the pre1nises to see \vhether or not it 
\Vas a safe place for him to unload (R. 276). He merely 
assu1ned that everything \Vas safe (R. 277) without look-
ing. He never looked to see where l\Ir. Walker, the truck 
drivPr ahead of him, stopped his truck (R. 277). After 
~[r. \\"" alker pulled out from unloading his truck ahead 
of .Mr. Haslam, :air. Hasla1n backed his truck toward the 
bucket but didn't back up as far as l\Ir. vValker had to 
unload (R. 278) .. A.fter ~lr. Haslam found out that he 
hadn't backed up to the bucket, he made no effort to get 
in the truck and back it further to facilitate unloading 
the truck (R. 278). 
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The power pole that ~Ir. Haslan1 did not see, accord-
ing to his own testin1ony (R. 279), \\~a~ son1e lG" in di-
ameter and 25 to 26 feet out of the ground. l\lr. 1-laslain 
never saw the po,ver pole or the powerline \\~hen h~ 
stepped out of the truck ( R. 279). He did not ~Pe the 
four overhead po,verlines, but stated that if he had looked 
up, it \\·as so1nething he could have seen (R. 280). In 
fact, Mr. Haslam said that both the pole and the power-
lines were something plain to be seen if he had looked 
up (R. 280). 
At the time he "'"as injured, Mr. Haslam \Vas stand-
ing with the bucket hanging from the boorn between hin1 
and the crane ( R. 280). 
Mr. vValker, the eye 'vitness to the accident, who had 
worked with l\Ir. Haslarn since about 1952 · ( R. 241) and 
who had had the same experience as l\ir. Haslam, said 
he kne'v about the danger of powerlines (R. ·243). He 
testified that he (R. 243) spotted his truck in:·a safe place 
and that he unloaded it ahead of Mr. Haslan1 (R. 243). 
He unloaded five buckets of concrete safely (R. 243). 
1\Ir. Walker also told us that the truck driver at a 
job site can't unload his truck any faster than the job 
foreman needs the concrete, and that the truck driver 
takes an order from the job foreman (R. 244) as to when 
to start unloading, and that you don't start unloading 
the ready-mix truck until the concrete bucket is placed 
(R. 2-!4), and that the truck driver unloads-the ready-mix 
as slowly or as fast as they bring the bucket, unless told 
otherwise (R. 245). After the accident 1\Ir. ''; alker un-
loaded Mr. Fiaslam's truck by backing it 6 or 8 feet fur~ 
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thPr soutlnvurd (R. 2-17). 'fhere \Yas no condition on the 
.~round that kPpt ~lr. Hasla1n or ~lr. \Y alker from back-
ing further to the south (R. 2-!8). 
'rhP DPfPndant, Frank Cottrell, 'vas the job foreman 
l'or thP church (R. :J5~). ~I r. Cottrell ordered the crane 
t'rotn . \ellH' Crane Rental Company (R. 365), but did not 
tell the1n "·here he was going to set it. The crane was 
hrought to thP job by Hyrum Petersen, the operator (R. 
:366), and on arrival at the job site, ~Ir. Cottrell (R. 366) 
8hO\\·rd ~lr. Petersen where the concrete pour was to be 
dotH'. Jl r. Petersen and ~Ir. Cottrell discussed the setting 
of the crane and then selected the spot where it 'vas 
placed, as that spot was actually the only spot available 
for placing the crane and using it to 1nove the concrete 
fro1n the ready-mL""< trucks to the place of the pour (R. 
366). ~lr. Cottrell also ordered the ready-mix concrete 
fro1n lTtah Sand and Gravel (R. 367). On Exhibit D-2 
Jlr. Cottrell has dra\Yn a circle and 'vritten in "Place of 
Pour" to indicate the area of the foundation being poured 
at the tin1e of the accident. nir. Cottrell said that he was 
fruniliar with the customs and practices of unloading 
ready-1ni..x concrete at job sites, and that the man re-
~ponsible for unloading the concrete out of the truck and 
putting it into the gabro bucket was the driver of the 
truck (R. 370). l\Ir. ·C·ottrell said that the powerline could 
not be degenerized. He was using a 320 three phase power 
tool in his shed, and that demanded four 'vires (R. 372). 
Hyrum Petersen was sent to the job site by Acme 
Crane Rental. :\Ir. Petersen found there 'vas only one 
place he could place the crane (R. 387), and after a con-
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ference \Vith l\lr. Cottrell, he placed it in that spot for 
the purpose of unloading the ready-mix trucks. At thP 
time \\Talker's truck pulled out, the crane operator, lfy-
rurn Petersen, was moving the last gabro bucket of <-'On-
crete frorn Walker's truck to the place of the pour, and 
did not see Scott Haslarn back his truck in for unloading 
(R. 393). On diagran1 Exhibit 2-D, l\lr. Peter~l1n placed 
the crane at the tirne of the accident and drew an "'F" to 
mark the front of the c.rane, and mentioned they \Vere 
\Yorking over the rear of it because of n1ore stability (R. 
399). He had the c.rane sitting so that the booru stuek out 
at approxilnately a 70 to 75 foot degree (R. 400), and at 
the time of the accident the crane \Vas equipped \vith a 
60 foot stick or boom \vith a 30 foot jib attached on the 
end (R. 400). l\Ir. Petersen took a crayon and dre\v a 
circle sho\ving the radius of the S\ving of the gabro 
bucket on the stick at the angle of the boom at the time 
of the injury (R. 401). This radius is sho\vn on Exhibit 
2-D. l\Ir. Petersen took his directions fron1 the rnan in 
charge, Frank Cottrell, as to ,,~here the concrete pour \Yas 
to be done ( R. 401). l\Ir. Petersen told us that it is im-
possible to tell the distance or judge the distance between 
the cable of the crane and the high tension \vires from 
his position in the cab of the crane (R. 40±). At the time 
Mr. Haslam was injured, l\f r. Peterson \Vas lo\vering the 
gabro bucket down\vard and swinging the boom slightly 
to the north (R. ±07). J\Ir. Petersen said he sa\v the 
bucket move to the north as it got to the ground level, 
but did not see the party moving it (R. 408). He did not 
see l\Ir. Haslan1 reach for the gabro bucket (R. ±08). 
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l.>aul H. Paulsen testified that he i8 one of the part-
nPr~ in the Acn1e Crane Rental Con1pany and that he did 
not heur about the accident until about a year before the 
tiuu_. of trial (It 468). l\lr. Paulsen also tt•stified that the 
t•ranP \Va8 rented to the church on an hourly basis, and 
that he furnished the crane "rith the operator, Hyru1n 
I )Ptersen, and John v"'" aldez, the oiler' at the rate of 
$1~.00 pPr hour (R. 468). l\lr. Paulsen and none of the 
other defendants doing business as the Ac1ne Crane Rent-
al Con1pany \Vere present at the time Grant Scott Has-
lrun \Vas injured (R. 468). Mr. Paulsen said that when an 
operator is sent out with a crane, he takes his orders 
fron1 ". hoever is in charge of pouring the concrete on 
the job (R. 470). 
John , .. aldez, the oiler, at the time of the accident 
was on tht• 'vall signalling the operator where to place 
the bucket to du1np the pour from the gabro bucket (R. 
-!7-!). 
In regard to his injury, Mr. Haslam testified that 
after the accident, Blaine Thomas took hi1n to Dr. Silas 
~. S1nith (R. 250). After being exrunined by the doctor, 
Mr. Haslrun said he was told to come back the next day. 
~Ir. Haslan1 said that he had some burns on his hands, 
but at the tin1e of the trial the burns were not visible, 
and his hands had healed pretty Inuch (R. 251). The day 
follo,ving the accident l\Ir. Haslam 'vent back to work 
(R. ~53), and he continued to work thereafter (R. 253). 
Dr. Silas Smith examined Mr. Haslam on the date of 
the accident and said that he went over him fairly care-
fully and decided that there 'vas no systemic change as 
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far as he could deter1nine fron1 what \\·as purported to 
be an electric shock. He said the burn on his left hand 
and his pulse, blood pressure, chest, and heart all seemed 
to be quite normal. He had him X-rayed by Dr. 'Yint(•r 
and stated that he noticed some abrasion and slight dis-
coloration of his left shoulder. He described the injury 
or the abrasion to the left shoulder as being rather supPr-
ficial (R. 375). The injury did not require a bandage or 
dressing by Dr. ~hnith (R. 375), and Dr. Smith concluded 
that as far as any injury to the left shoulder, no medical 
treatment \\~as necessary (R. 375). Dr. Smith told l\fr. 
Haslam that he felt the injury to the shoulder was no-
thing,. and that he could attend his work and go ahead 
\Yith it "·ithout any harm to himself (R. 375). Dr .Smith 
s~id that from his examination, he thought Mr. Haslam 
was capable of going back to "\\rork the next day (R. 375). 
Dr. Silas Smith read the X-ray taken by Dr. '\7"inter and 
could observe no bony change or injury (R. 375). 
During the trial Mr. S1noot decided to stipulate that 
he was making no claim for a shoulder injury as far as 
separation of acromioclavicular joint (R. 376). 
On cross examination 1\ir. Haslam said that the 
burns on his hand left a slight discoloration of the skin 
(R. 284), and that these are the only burns he had on 
his. body (R. 284). 1\tir. Haslam also testified that the 
burns did not require any bandages (R. 285). 
W,i th regard to other injuries, these questions were 
asked of !\Ir. Haslam: (R. 285, R. 286) 
· Q. ''Did you ever InJure your body or your 
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~boulder or your hands in any other accident 
like this ? " 
;\. ~~xo. I had son1e ribs that WPl'P cracked once 
on a ~tPering "'heel of a truck." 
Q. "~\nd that is the only other prior injury you 
ever had?'' 
.. :\. "()h, I have had 1ny back dislocated when \Ve 
had our old chute, "'"hen we had to raise them 
'vith our strength and not with the hydraulic 
hoh;ts." 
Q. H Let 1ne ask you this : Did you ever InJure 
your hands in any other accident~" 
.-\. "No." 
Q. "Did you ever injure your shoulder - your 
left shoulder - in any other accident~" 
.. :\. "No." 
Q. ·~Ho\v long \Vere you in Dr. Smith's place get-
ting this treat1nent - this salve on your 
hands?" 
.\. •'Oh, I ilnagine I \Vas there t\venty or thirty 
1uinutes." 
The day follo,ving the aceident ~Ir. Haslam went 
back to \vork ( R. 286). 
It \Ya~ not until in January of 1961, a year following 
the aecident, that ~Ir. Hasl~am visited Dr. Pemberton, 
an o1thopedic specialist. Dr. Pemberton testified that 
prior to January 5, 1961 Scott Haslam had not been a 
patient of his, and that he did not see him until a year 
after the accident (R. 304). He said th·at the only thing 
he kne'v about the accident on January 19, 1960 was what 
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n!r. Haslam ·to~d him (R. 305), and originally \Vhen he 
~a"~ him on January 5, 1961, he thought l\Ir. Ha~lan1 had 
a minimal sep,ara.tion of the left aeromi'Oclavicular joint 
(R. 305). He als·o thought that perhaps l\Ir. Haslam had 
·a rotor-cuff tear. His finding in the exploratory opera-
tion ,,~as that his original dia.gnos~s ·of a rotor-cuff tPar 
\Vas \vrong (R .. 306). He also testified that separation:s of 
the type found in l\fr. Haslam's acromioclavicular joint 
ordinarily \Yere not painful (R. 307), and he also stated 
thrut as far as the acromioclavicul·ar was concerned, the 
condition he found might have been an anatomical thing 
and that there \Yas no separation at all (R. 307, 308). Dr. 
Pemberton alS'o testified that after the operation ~fr. 
H~aiS'lam had no limitation of movement in his arm, rotat-
ing it internally or extern;ally (R. 309). Likewise, he 
found no lim·itation in adduction and none in circumduc-
tion or extension. On cross examination ( R. 311) Dr. 
Pen1berton \vas asked: 
Q. "In ans\\~ering Mr. Smoot's question as to 
"\vhether or not the injury that you found, 
\vhen you operated, could he related to the 
accident of January 19, 1960, you were as-
suining thrut the history he gave you was 
correct and he only had this one accident; 
and you we-re rel1ating it to it because you 
f h . . ~" had no other "~ay to account or t e InJury. 
A. ''That's true." 
Q. "Let me ask YOU: A~ssume \Ve can sho\v you 
he had previ~us injury to this shoulder, and 
had injuries before, wouldn't it be a reason-
able assumption, maybe one of those had 
10 
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eau~Pd injury to his ~houlder "rhich you found 
in the bursa~" 
..:\. ..rrhis is a possibility, and I think we al,vays 
have to depend on the history the patient 
gives, in nl'aking a diagnosis and proceeding 
with treatntent. Presumably, this m~an had 
dated di~sability - not just pain, but disabil-
ity - inability doing his work - from this 
injury, as he stated to me; so I \vent on that 
assmnption." 
Dr. Pe1nberton also ~aid that if ~I r. Haslam had in-
jured hi~ shoulder on September 1-±, 1957 and had had it 
struck by a ~ x 4 on that date, that this injury could 
have caused the condition of ~Ir. Haslam for which he 
operated. 
Dr. Pe1nberton also testified that bursitis or inflam-
Jnation of the bursa is a condition ·that people get without 
accident (R. 314) and that as you ge·t older, you have 
1nore of a chance of getting it (R. 314). He likewise testi-
fied ·that if you operated on such a condition not eaused 
by acc.ident, that the appearance of the bursa would be 
the sruue as one caused by accident, and that the remedy 
\Vould be th~ sa1ne. He also said that injury to the shoul-
der does not necessarily cause an inflamed bursa (R. 
315). Dr. Pemberton said from his examination of the 
bursa that there \r'as no indication as to when it hemor-
ragt~d and becrune inflamed (R. 315). In fact, Dr. Pem-
berton said that the inflammation wasn't acut.e and that 
it could h·ave been there for as 1nany as five years or 
that it could have been there for three years. He said 
rhat if Mr. Hru;lam had had other injuries to his shoulder 
11 
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\vhile \vorking on the job, that they could haYe caused 
the condition \Y'hic'h he f'Ound (R. 316). He said that the 
only ·thing he aCJtually repaired was the bursa which was 
re1noved, and that he did not kno'v "\vhether the accident 
raused it or not, and that there \\~as no \\~ay he could tell 
\vhether it did or not (R. 315). 
nlr. OrS'on I. Jacobson \vas called as a \\·itness, and 
he testified that he \vas a Safety DireCJtor and Personnel 
Director at l7tah Sand and Gravel Company and had 
he en so since 1954 ( R. 432). 1\ir. Jacobson told us in 195 7 
l\lr. Haslan1 reported injuries in July and X ove1nber. 
~Ir. Jacobson testified that in November· of 1957 I\lr. 
Haslam made a report of an injury to him to give to 
the State Insurance Fund, and that at that tin1e he pulled 
the muscles of his upper back and left shoulder (R. 434). 
On Se·ptember 14, .1957 ~lr. Jacobson testified thrut 1\ir. 
Hasla1n told him . while lifting a chute, a fello\v \\·orker 
dropped his end, causing ·p,atient to S\\~ing around and 
hit a 2 x 4 "\vith his left' shoulder, causing pain, and the 
pain developed "\vhen he returned to "\vork on ~londay, 
S·eptember 16, 1957 and 'vhile he was lifting the chute 
again (R. 436). 1\Ir. Jacobson als:o testified (R. 434) that 
l\fr. Haslan1 received an injury while lifting a mixer 
chute in July of 19·57 and that he wrenched his back. 
After ~the injury ·on September 14, 1957, Mr. Haslam 
sought medical treatment from Dr. George ~-,. · Parker, 
a chiropractor \Vho treated him after this alleged injury, 
and he· was not called as a \vitness (R. 435).' · · · 
.... 
Mr. Jacobson also testified that 1n November .of 
12 
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1~);>~, ~I r. Hasla1n again was injured, and his injury was 
n·porit:lo(l to the State Insuranee Fund, 'vhen he reached 
into the cab of his truck fur a clutch lever and the door 
of thP truck ble'v shut, knocking him into the door frame . 
. \fter it \\~as brought to ~lr. llaslan1's attention that 
he had had prior injuries to his left shoulder, he did not 
take U1e stand a.nd deny the truth of Mr. Jacobson's 
:.; t a tent en ts. 
After returning to work lVIr. Haslam \vas able to 
OJH•rah_l the h·vers that control the hydraulic system 
for n1oving the ce1nent chute around (R. 445). 
~Ir. Blaine Thorrul;s of Utah Sand and Gravel Com-
pany and the supe·rvisor, testified that he 'vas familiar 
"·ith the general custom and practice of a truck driver 
\\rhile 'va.iting to unload his truck, and that this man 
:.;hould ~tand in the clear a.t all times (R. 447) and that 
he should not touch the gabro bucket until it is on the 
ground ( R. -!-!8). 
Dr. Paul l\iilligan was called as a witness by Acme 
Crane Rental Company. He testified that he examined 
~Ir. Haslarn's left shoulder and found a well healed scar 
over the top of the shoulder and over the front of the 
left shoulder itself. He put the shoulder through its 
range of rnotion and found that the only limitation in 
n1otion 'vas that he lacked 20 degrees of getting it up as 
high as he could get the other arm, although he could 
push the hand the rest of the 'vay. He found no limita-
tion of his ability to rotate the shoulder internally or 
externally and no evidence of shrinkage of any muscles 
(R. 463). Dr. Milligan testified as to the cause of loss of 
13 
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adduction or raising· of the left ar1n, that thi~ i~ due to 
adhesions in the left shoulder and that he did not know 
the cause of the adhesrons. Dr. ~Iilligan \vas asked if he 
had an opinion as to \vhich accident caused the infla1ned 
bursa, if any, \vhether it \Vas the accident on January 19, 
1960 or the one on September 14, 1957 or the one on 
~epte1nber 16, 1957, or the one on November 18, 1958, 
and he reported that he had no opinion as to "~hich of 
these injuries u1ight have caused the inflamed bursa (R. 
465). Dr. ~lilligan like,vise told the court that he could 
not diagnose the time as to \Vhen an infla1ned bursa 
arose (R. 467). He did, ho\vever, say that n1os.t inflan1ed 
bursae are caused by degenerative changes that occur 
to the shoulder \vithout injury ( R. 4-G7). 
11r. Ha.sla1n's stay in the hospital only r,equired five 
days for the operation performed by Dr. Pe1nberton (R. 
255A). 
Follo\ving the operation in February of 1961, l\[r. 
Hasla1n testified that he \vas off \vork fron1 February 
7th until the 1:-;t of :J[ay. ~lr. Haslam used part of the 
tin1e he \va~ off \\~ork starting in April to build a 600 
foot addition onto the rear of his house, and he stated 
to Dr. ~1:illigan that he "~orked at digging the footings 
and putting in the for1ns himself (R. 461). He also stated 
that in ~fay and thereafter, he "·orked on \veekends to 
finish up the addition to his house. On recross-examina-
tion l\fr. Haslan1 admitted that the prior injuries, at least 
one or t\YO of the1n, required treatlnent by Dr. Parker 
(R. 479). 
Prior to sub1nitting the case to the jury, the De-
14 
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fPndant~, Pauh;en, dba Acme Crane Rental Company, 
rnoved the court, as a n1atter of law, to strike fro1n the 
rE.lcord nll testimony relating to loss of earnings on the 
part of the Plaintiff, past or future, all exhibits on 
~pP<·ial datnages, testimony relating to Dr. Pen1berton's 
treabnent and operation charge, including hospital bill, 
und all rlai1ns that the Plaintiff had for pennanent disa-
bility or pain arising from Dr. Pemberton's operation 
and the treahnent of the Plaintiff (R. 491). In addition, 
th(\ Defendants, dba Acme Crane Rental Company, re-
que~tP<l Instn1ction No. 38A be given to the jury (R. 
103) \\·hich is as follo,vs: 
Instruction No. 88A 
·~You arP instructed that as a matter of law 
the plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence the following items of which 
he claiins damage~s, and you must not award, if 
you should find in favor of the plaintiff, any 
damages for: 
1. .A.ny loss of earnings, past and future. 
:2. Any special damages for medical and hos-
pital expenses incident to Dr. Pemberton's 
treatment and operation upon the plaintiff. 
3. Any dam·ages for permanent disability or 
pain arising from Dr. Pe1nberton's opera-
tion and treatment of the plaintiff. 
Further, you are instructed that in this law 
suit, the plaintiff has proved no special damages, 
and you Inust not a\vard him any special damages 
for any expenses of doctors, medicines, X-rays 
and hospital services." 
15 
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A complicated set of special interrogatorie·s \ras sub-
Initted to the jury (R. 142-145). The jurors were instruc-
ted that if they returned a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff for damages, that ~th·ey were required to return 
a verdict in like amount in favor of the Paulsens again~t 
the Third Party Defendant, Hyrum Petersen ( R. 1-t;)). 
The first time the jury returned, they returned $50,000.00 
general damages in favor of the Plaintiff, and $558.80 
special damages, but on the mandatory instruction in 
favor of the defendants, Paulsen, they allo,ved $100.00 
general da1nages and $58.00 special da1nages, or a total 
of $158.00 (R. 1-!5 ). The jurors corrected their verdict 
in favor of the Third Party Plaintiffs only after being 
admonished by the eourt to do so and sent out a second 
time (R.145). 
The Defendants, Paulsen, dba Ac1ne Crane Rental 
Company, moved for a new trial upon the follo,ring 
grounds: 
1. Excessive da1nages appearing to have been 
given unde·r the influence of passion or pre-
judice, 
2. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the ver-
dict and that it is against la,v, and 
3. Error in la'v (R. 159). 
The Defendants, Paulsen, dba Acn1e Crane Rental 
Company, claimed that the plaintiff and Hyrum Peter-
sen \vere under the supervision and conrtrol of the de-
fendant church, and the. \York each \vas doing \vas a part 
of a trade or business o.f the employer church in building 
the stake house, and that as such, \vork1nen's compensa-
16 
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tion \vould he and was plaintiff's sole remedy, and that 
no recovery could be had against Ac1ne Crane Rental 
t\nnpa.ny in this suit (R. 37). 
II o\vever, in instructing the jury the court disre-
.~arded tht Defendant, Acn1e Crane Rental Con1pany's 
dPfense in this re:-;pect, the court gave Instruction No. 12 
(H. l~t~) " .. hirh is as follows: 
Instruction No. 12 
•'It has been established that the defendant, 
Hyru1n Peterson, was acting as agent for the 
P·aulson defendants and within the scope of his 
(lmployment at the time of the events out of which 
the accident involved in thi's case occurred. 
If, therefore, you find that said Hyrum Peter-
~on "Tas negligent, and that his conduct was the 
proxi1na.te, or a proximate, cause of plaintiff's 
injury, you are instructed that, as a matter of 
la,v, -you may find that the Paulson defendants 
were negligent, and that their neglig·ence so found 
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury." 
The Defendants, Paulsen, also requested the court 
to r~turn a directed verdict in their favor and against 
the plaintiff (R. 62). 
On the question of willful msiconduct, the court gave 
ln~truction X o. 7 (R·. 127) \vhich is as follows: 
Instruction No. 7 
"Plain tiff in this case bases his claim against 
defendants upon t"To kinds of misconduct: First, 
an act or acts of ordinary ... negligence, of which a 
definition has elsewhere in these instructions been 
given to you. Second, an act or acts that were 
"Tanton or reckless. 
To make an act wanton or reckless, the party 
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doing the act or failing to aet n1u~t be con~eiou~ 
of his conduct, and though having no intent to 
injure, 111ust be conscious, from his knowledge of 
the surrounding circums·tances and existing con-
ditions, th·at his conduct will narturally and prob-
ably result in injury to another. In order that the 
actor's conduct rnay be reckles~, it is not nece~­
sary that he hirnself recognize it a~ being extrerne-
ly dangerous. It is enough that he kno\\7 S or has 
reason to kno"'" of circumstances \vhich would 
bring hirn to the realization as an ordinary, reas-
onable man, of the highly dangerous character 
of his actions. 
Reckless or wanton misconduct differs from 
intentional \vrong doing in a very irnportant par-
ticular. While an act to be reckless must be in-
tended by the actor, the actor does not intend to 
cause the harm which results frorn it. It i::; enough 
that he realizes, or, from facts \\"hich he kno\vs, 
should realize tha:t there is a strong probability 
that harm may result, even though he hopes or 
even expects that his conduct \Yill ]H'oye harrn-
less." 
In the special interrogatories in ans\Yering the ques-
tion as to willful misconduct, it is to be noted that the 
jury found Petersen guilty of wanton or reckless Iniscon-
duct (R. 142), and Cottrell guilty of \\~anton or reckless 
misconduct (R. 7). The court granted the Defendants', 
Paulsen, motion to dismiss any claim against them be-
cause of their alleg·ed \villful or wanton n1isconduct ( R. 
484). 
Instruction No. 12 (R. 132) permitted the Defend-
ants, Acrne Crane Rental Cornpany, to be held liable for 
the negligent acts of Hyrun1 Petersen· only and did not 
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ARGU~fENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION 
TO HEAR APPEAL. 
Article 8, Section 9 of the Constitution of the State 
of lTtah provides as follows: 
Sec. 9 .. A.ppeals from district court- From justices' 
I ' ' 
"F ro1n all final judgments of the district 
CO'ltrts, there shall be a right of appeal to the 
Supreuze Court. The appeal shall be upon the rec-
ord n1ade in the court below and under such regu-
lations as m·ay be provided by law. In equity cases 
the appeal mny be on questions of both law and 
fact; in cases at la'\v the appeal shall be on que~s­
tions of la\v alone. Appeals shall also lie from the 
final orders and decrees of the Court in the ad-
ministration of decedent estates, and in cases of 
guardianship, as shall be provided by law. Ap-
peals shall also lie from the final judgment of 
justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases 
to the District Courts on both questions of law 
and fact, with such limitations and restrictions 
as shall· be provided by law; and the decision of 
the District Courts on such appeals shall be final, 
except in cases involving the validity or consti-
tutionality of a statute." 
Ru1e 72, l~tah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
(a) From Final Judgments. "An appeal may be 
taken to the Supre1ne Court from all fimd judg-
nzents, ·in accordance 'U)ith these rules; provided, 
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that in actions originating in city courts and in 
justices' courts, the decision of the di~ trict rourt 
on ap·peal shall be final, except: ( 1) In casef' in-
volving the validity or constitutionality of a stat-
ute or ordinance; and (2) In actions originating 
in citv courts in \Yhich the a1nount in controversy 
~ . 
exceeds $100.00, exclusive of costs." 
Rule 72(b) l~tah Rules of Civil Procedure, also pro-
vides for interlocutory appeal~. Ho\\~ever, the Plaintiff-
Appellant's Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal fron1 
the Order Granting a K ew Trial "\Yas denied by thi~ rourt 
on July 30, 1963, Case No. 9935. 
The record does not indicate, in Case K o. 9935, or 
in this case that Plaintiff-.A.ppellant has filed a Petition 
for a Rehearing from the Order Denying an Interlocu-
tory Appeal. 
In Na.tional Farmers Union Property and Casualty 
Company vs. Thompson (1955) 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P. 2d 
2-!9, this court said an order granting a ne"~ trial is dif-
ferent in character than an order denying one, and the 
latter terminates the cause, "\Yhile the fonner operates to 
vacate the judgn1ent and reinstate the case as one un-
disposed of before the court, and over \Yhich the court 
re,tains jurisdiction. 
It is submitted that the trial court having retained 
jurisdiction of the case by granting the Inotion for a new 
trial, tha,t this eourt does not have jurisdiction in view 
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POINT II. 
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE BY A 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT 
THE OPERATION AND TREATMENT OF DR. PEM-
BERTON AROSE FROl\1 THE INJURIES HE RE-
CEIVED IN THE ACCIDENT ON JANUARY 19, 1960. 
l)r. Paul Pe1nberton, the plaintiff's orthopedic spec-
iali~t, tP~tified that the only thing he knew about the 
a('eident on Jan nary 19, 1960 was what the plaintiff told 
hin1 about it (R. 305). On cross exa1nination Dr. P·ember-
ton (It 311) stated that in answering 1\Ir. Smoot's ques-
tion a:--; to \vhethPr or not the injury that he found when 
he operated could be related to the accident of January 
U). 1960, he said he was assun~in,q the history he was 
giren was correct, and that Mr. Haslam only had this 
one accident, and there was no other way to account for 
the injury. Further, Dr. Pemberton said that assuming 
~lr. Haslan1 had injured his shoulder and back on Sep-
tember 1-!, 1957, that c-ould also cause the condition for 
which he operated (R. 311-313). Dr. Pemberton said that 
if ~lr. Haslam had had a previous injury to this shoulder, 
it \vould be a reasonable assun1ption that maybe one of 
these had caused injury to the shoulder 'vhich he found 
in the bursa (R. 311). Like,vise, Dr. Pemberton said from 
the exatnination of the bursa, you could not tell when it 
beca1ne infla1ned, and that the condition could have been 
there for as many as five years (R. 315). Likewise, Dr. 
PPmberton said that if Mr. Haslam· had had an injury 
to his shoulder on at least three occasions in the period 
of t'vo prior years before this accident, all of which 
occurred on the job, that these could very well have 
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caused the condition w··hich he found (R. 316). Further, 
in answering to 1\Ir. Snow's question (R. 318), Dr. Penl-
berton said that he didn't know whether the accident on 
January 19, 1960 caused the condition for \vhich he oper-
ated in F·ebruary, 1961, and that there was no way you 
could tell what caused the condition for which he oper-
ated. Dr. Pemberton even said the inflamed bursa could 
occur without accident (R. 314). 
On redire·ct-examination !1r. Smoot asked Dr. Pem-
berton this question: 
Q. "Now, Doctor, the counsel had made quite a 
point of the fact that certain things 'could 
haye' taken place with reference to the bursa. 
Assuming a person who has been able to work 
on a ready-mix truck, as is described to you 
in Scott Haslam's history, and that he had no 
difficulty in operating that truck, and doing 
the work that he was accustomed to doing, 
and about which he related to you, assuming 
all that situation, you have an opinion as to 
what really caused this inflamed bursa~" 
And the answer he got was : 
A. "I believe it was, assuming that this history 
that I got from him was true, it was my judg-
ment, and still is, that the inflamed bursa was 
due to the injury he suffered in January, the 
year before I sa'v him - 1960." 
Mr. Jacobson, the Safety and Personnel Director for 
Utah Sand and Gravel Company, testified following Dr. 
Pemberton that in November of 1957 he twice reported 
injuries, and that while turning around in a small area, 
he pulled the back muscles of the upper back and left 
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~houlder (R. 434). Also, 1\Ir. Jacobson testified that in 
July of 1957 he received an injury while lifting a mixer 
chute and wrenched his back. In September of 1957 Mr . 
.Jacobson said ~Ir. Haslam reported that while lifting a 
rhute, a fellow 'vorker dropped his end, causing him to 
s\ving around and strike a 2 x 4 board with his left 
~boulder causing pain, and that he saw Dr. Parker as 
a result of this injury (R. 436). l\{r. Haslam also re-
ported an injury to l\lr. Jacobson in November of 1958~ 
saying that while pouring curb and gutter, he reached 
into the cab and that the door of the truck blew shut, 
knocking him into the door frame and injuring his back 
(R. 440). 
None of these injuries were reported to Dr. Paul 
Pemberton prior to his testifying for the plaintiff on 
direct examination. 
Dr. Pemberton was not recalled as a witness. 
Dr. Paul ~Iilligan, the defendants' witness, testified 
that you could not diagnose the time as to when an in-
flamed bursa arose (R. 467), and said he had no opinion 
as to which of the four previous injuries may have caused 
the inflamed bursa (R. 467). 
On further cross examination, Mr. H·aslam admitted 
that he had h·ad the other prior injuries (R. 478). 
He made further admissions as to the prior injuries 
on rebuttal examination by his own counsel (R. 477, 478). 
~Ir. Hasla1n admitted the history he gave Dr. Pem-
berton of only an accident and injury on J·anuary 19, 
1960 was not true, and Dr. Pemberton qualified his opin-
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ion, saying that assuming the history w~s true, that he 
would relate the inflamed bursa to the accident on Janu-
ary 19, 1960 (R. 318). 
The plaintiff's minor disability is a result of adhe-
sions following the operation by Dr. Pemberton. The 
trial court refused to strike from the record all testin1ony 
relating to loss of earnings on the part of the plaintiff, 
past or future, and all exhibits on special damages, testi-
mony relating to Dr. Pen1berton's treatment, and testi-
mony relating to his pennanent disability (R. 491), ana 
refused to give requested Instruction No. 38-A (R. 103). 
The jury filled in the void and sup~plied the proof for 
the plaintiff. 
In IJJ.oore vs. the Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company (1956) 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P. 2d -!89, 
\vhere a suit was brought for injuries to the plaintiff's 
back and nervous system, including a ruptured inter-
vertebral disc in the lo\ver lumbar region of the spine, 
and where the testimony of Dr. Clegg \Vas based upon 
examination plus history of pain as given by the plain-
tiff, and that there was a nerve irritation, and that it 
''?as possible the accident initiated the condition, and the 
nerve irritation \Vas possibly due to pressure on nerve 
beeause of irritation from a disc, and 'vhere the testi-
mony was merely sufficient to establish that a disc injury 
was not impossible, this court held the District Court 
should have given the defendant's requested instruction 
taking consideration of a ruptured intervertebral dise to 
the jury on the ground there was no competent evidence 
on the 1natter, and rev~rsed a v~rdict for the plaintiff and 
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.~ranh'd the defPndant a new trial. In the principal case 
Judge Faux decided to keep jurisdiction and grant a 
new trial. 
In Chief Consolidated lll iniug Co1npany vs. Salis-
bury (19~~) 61 Utah 66, 210 P. 929, 'vhere the plaintiff's 
t{'~titnony \ras to the effect the accident might have, or 
eould have, accelerated heart disease, and there being no 
other evidence than this, the court held that an a'vard 
upon such speculative evidence must be annulled. 
In this case there are a number of probabilities or 
po~~ibilities as to when l\Ir. Haslam obtained his in-
flatned bursa. He may have got the inflamed bursa in 
.July of 1957: September, 1957; November, 1957; or No-
Yl'tnber, 1958, or even in the accident in question on 
Jan nary 19, 1960. X one of the doctors could say. A choice 
of probabilities does not meet the requirement of a pre-· 
ponderance of the evidence. 
In AIL:arado vs. Tucker (1954) 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P. 
~d 896, \\'"here the plaintiff's 'vitness, a police officer, 
testified on direct exan1ination the speed of the plain-
tiff's car "·as 35 1n.p.h., but on cross examination, modi-
fied his testimony and said the speed was somewhere 
bet,veen 25 to 30 m.p.h., our court said the burden of 
proving the charge of speeding was upon the plaintiff, 
and that this burden was not satisfied with speculation 
or conjecture, but only on a preponderance of the evi-
dence, and that a choice of probabilities does not meet 
this requirement. 
Actually, in this case the plaintiff does not even 
come up "rith a choice of probabilities as Dr. Pemberton 
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said his opinion relating the need for the operation to 
the accident on January 19, 1960 was only true if the 
history he was given was true, and this was clearly shown 
not to be the case. 
When the conflict in testimony comes from the plain-
tiff's own witnes~ses or the plaintiff's own testimony, the 
plaintiff is not entitled to the most favorable probability, 
Fowler vs. Pleasant Valley Coal Cornpany (1898) 16 
Utah 348, 52 P. 594. In ~4.lvarado vs. Tucker, supra., this 
court said the testimony of a witness on direct examina-
tion is no stronger than modified on cross examination, 
and that a single part of an officer's testimony cannot 
be singled out to the exclusion of other parts of his 
testimony. 
As Dr. Pemberton said his opinion relating the oper-
ation and treatment to the accident on January 19, 1960 
was only true if there were no other injuries, there is 
no competent medical evidence to support the verdict, 
and the trial court properly granted a new trial. 
POINT III. 
EXCESSIVE DAMAGES WERE GIVEN UNDER 
THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE. 
The best exhibit as to the passion and prejudice of 
the jury is shown by the ans\vers they gave to questions 
10 and 11 in the special interrogatories (R. 145). Al-
though the jury was instructed to award the Third Party 
Plaintiffs, the Pa.ulsens, verdicts in the same amount as 
they awarded the Plaintiff in the foregoing interroga-
tory, they, nevertheless, refused to follow the court's 
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1nnndatory instruction and \vhile they gave the Plaintiff 
$~l0,000.00 general da.Inages, they gave the Paulsens only 
$100.00 gPneral datnages, and where they gave the Plain-
tiff $~>;>~L~O special datnagPs, they gave the Paulsens only 
$~l~.00 and had to be adtnonished and directed by the 
eonrt to go back and correct their verdict. :\Ir. Haslam 
\\'as able to go back to \vork the day follo,ving the acci-
dent, and \rorked straig·ht through. His loss of earnings 
und medical specials did not arise until an operation a 
yPar follo\\·ing the accident and then his own doctor, Dr. 
PPtnberton, stated he could only relate the treatment 
and operation he performed to the accident if he could 
a~snnlP the histor~~ was true, and this was found not to 
be true. 
The loss of earnings was not substantial, and it was 
sho\\·n that l\1r. Haslam lost at least a part of his time 
fro1n work because of an addition of 600 sq. ft., which he 
\ras building on his house ( R. 461). We all know it is a 
little hard to build a 600 sq. ft. addition at home and do 
thP footings and concrete work and have additional time 
to w·ork overtilne extra hours to increase our earnings. 
~lr. Haslan1's only disability wa.s a 10 to 15 per cent 
liinitation and adduction of his left ar1n, or inability to 
raise it straight over his left shoulder. There is no show-
ing that this type of disability "~ould limit his earnings 
or his ability to hold a job, and in fact, prior to the trial, 
he got a better job "~orking for the Teamster's Union. 
In Stan1p rs. the [inion Pacific Railroad Co. (1954) 5 
l~tah ~d 397, 303 P. 2d 279, \vhere the a\vard made by the 
jury had no basis and fact and \Yas so excessive as to be 
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shocking to one's conscience and too clearly indicated 
passion or prejudice, and it abundantly appeared that 
there was no evidence to support or justify the verdict, 
this court held the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to grant a ne\v trial. In Starnp vs. U n·ion Pacific 
Railroad Co,mpany, supra., where the plaintiff claimed he 
continued to suffer recurrent pain as particles of a tor-
p·edo worked out of his eyeball \vhere they had lodged 
after an exp·losion, and where he continued to work ex-
cept for 12 days immediately following the accident, and 
where the case \Vas tried about a year after the accident, 
and where at the time of trial the plaintiff co1nplained 
of he~adaches and that he feared loss of his eyesight, and 
that he \vorried, although he had not inquired of his 
doctors as to any justification for his worry, and \Yhere 
the plaintiff's doctor, an eye specialist, testified that he 
had examined the plaintiff and that in his opinion the 
plaintiff was not in any danger, and that he had advised 
the plaintiff at the time of the first examination 13 days 
after the accident, and that there \vas no damage to 
plaintiff's ability to see, and where a verdict was re-
turned in the su1n of $12,500.00 less $2,500.00 deducted 
under the F .E.L.A. rule, this court held the verdict \vas 
without all reasonable bounds for the detailed injury 
and that it had a duty of a\Yarding a ne\v trial or a re-
mittitur. Since Jensen vs. Den1.:er and R£o Grande West-
ern Railroad (1914) 44 Utah 100, 138 P. 1185, 1192, the 
rule in Utah has been that the jury cannot go unbridled 
and unchecked in awarding damages. 
In considering the damages to award the plaintiff, 
the jury should have been limited to the damages and 
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injuriPs he ~u~t.ainPd on the date of the accident and the 
treahnPnt rPndered hy Dr. Silas Stnith. 
POINT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
JUSTIFY THE VERDICT, AND THE VERDICT WAS 
AGAINST THE LAW. 
fn support of this point, we will submit no argument 
in addition to that raised under Points II and III. 
P.OINT V. 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION WAS THE 
PLAINTIFF'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY. 
lTtah has an extremely broad Workmen's Compensa-
tion act. Section 35-1-42, lTtah Code Annotated 1953, is 
as follows: 
35-1--t2. Etnployers enumerated and defined -
Regularly employed - Independent contractors 
- HThe follo"ring shall constitute employers sub-
ject to the provisions of this title : 
(1} The state, and each county, city, town and 
school district therein. 
(:2) Every person, finn and private corp·or-
ation, including every public utility, having in 
service one or more workmen or operatives regu-
larly en1ployed in the same business, or in or 
about the same establishment, under any contract 
of hire, express or implied, oral or 'vritten, except 
agricultural laborers and domestic servants; pro-
vided, that employers of agricultural laborers and 
domestic servants, shall have the right to come 
under the terms of this title by complying with 
the provisions thereof and the rules and regula-
tions of the commission. 
'·The term 'regularly' as herein used shall in-
clude all employments in the usual course of the 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trade, business, profession or occupation of the 
employer, whether continuous throughout thll 
year or for only a portion of the year. 
"Where any entployer procures any work to 
be done wholly or in pa.rt for him u y a contractor 
over whose work he retain,s superrision or con-
trol, and such work is a paTt or process in the 
trade or b1tsiness of the c1nployer, such contrac-
tor, and all persons employed by him, and all sub-
contractors under him, .and all persons employed 
by any such subcont-ractors, shall be deemed, with-
in the meaning of this section, employees of sucn, 
original employer. Any person, firm or corpor-
ation engaged in the p~erformance of work as an 
independent contractor shall be deemed an em-
ployer within the Ineaning of this section. The 
tenn 'independent contractor/ as herein used, is 
defined to be any p~erson, association or corpor-
ation engaged in the performance of any work 
for ~another, who, while so engaged, is independent 
of the employer in all that p·ertains to the execu-
tion of the work, is not subject to the rule or 
control of the employer, is engaged only in the 
performance orf a definite job or piece of work, 
and is subordinate to the employer only in effect-
ing a result in accordance with the employer's 
design." 
From the above definition, it's obvious that you do 
not have to he on the payroll of any cert1ain person to 
be an emp~loyee 'vithin the definition of the \\Torkmen's 
Comp·ensation Act. If the church retained supervision 
or control in any respect over the 'vork being done by 
Scott Has~lam and Hyrum Petersen in the building of 
the stake house, both Hyrum Petel~sen and Scott Haslam 
were employees within the meaning of the Workmen':-; 
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Cotnpensation A<·t. l~:vPryonc agrePs that Frank Cottrell, 
the forPnlan for the church, ordered the concrete, ordered 
Uu.\ cranP, controlled the rate of pour, and arranged the 
job sitP to pour the concrete. Mr. fiaslam ·coul·d not go 
np and dlunp the concrete until the church was ready to 
rPe(live it. and ~I r. Hyru1n Petersen cauld not take the 
concrete and dtnnp it until the church was ready for the 
pour. Without any doubt, both of these men were under 
thP ~npervision and control of the church. 
35-1-60, l'"tah Code Annotated 1953, reads as follo"Ts: 
:~;>-1-60. Exclusive re1nedy against employer, or 
officer, agent or employee - O·ccupational disease 
execpted. - "The r"ight to recover compensation 
pu rsua·nt to thr provisions of this title for injuries 
su.stained by an etnployee, whether result,ing in 
death or uot, shall be the e.rcZ.usive remedy against 
the en1ployer and shall be the exclusive rem~edy 
aqai nst any officer, agent or e1nployee of the em-
ployer and the liabilities of the employer ·imposed 
by this act shall be in place of .any and all other 
civilliabili.ty u·hatsoever, at common law or other-
wise, to such etnployre or to his spouse, " .. idow; 
children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, 
personal representatives, guardian, or any other 
person 'V'homsoever, on aecount of any accident 
or injury· or death, in .any way contracted, sus-
tained, aggravated or incurred by such employee 
in the course of or because of or ari·sing out of 
his employment, and no action at law may be 
maintained against an employer or against any 
officer, agent or employee of the employer based 
upon any accident, injury or death of an em-
ployee. X othing in this se·ction, ho,vever, shall p~re­
vent an employee (or his dependents) from filing 
a claim with the industrial commission orf Utah 
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for c.ompensation in those eases \vithin the pro-
visions of the li tah Occupational Disease Disa-
bility Act, as amended." 
In lJlurray vs. Wasatch Grading Conzpany (1929) 73 
Utah 430, 27 4 P. 940, \\"here the plaintiff \vas not on the 
immediate payroll of the employer, he \Vas held, never-
theless, to be an e1nployee, and that Workmen's Con1-
p~ensation was the exclusive remedy. In Murray t·s. 
Wasatch Grading Company, supra, ,,,. asatch Grading 
Company ha:d a contract to widen the highway in Spanish 
Fork ~c~anyon adjacent to the railroad tracks of the Den-
ver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Comp~any. Rock 
was blasted from the mountainside and rolled onto the 
tracks. The plain~tiff l\l urray, "\Vas on the payroll of the 
railroad company and was taken to the job site by the 
railroad roadma.ster. The grading company was required 
to reimburse the railroad cornpany for the \\"ages of the 
plaintiff, and the plaintiff's duties required that he re-
ceive messages as to when trains would arrive and that 
by telephone he \vould communicate with the railro'ad 
dispatcher. ''1hen not con1municating, he was required 
to flag trains and assist in re1noving rocks from the 
tracks with other employees of "W"'a.satch Grading Com-
pany. Wasatch Grading Company carried 'Vorlo.nen'~ 
Comp~ensation insurance \\"ith the State Insurance Fund 
and did not list the p·laintiff as an employee. The plain-
tiff was injured 'vhile re·moving rocks from the tracks, 
and the trial court refused to direct a verdict in favor of 
Wasatch Grading c:ompany, and on ap~peal this court 
said where any employer procures any work to be done 
wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose 
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work he retains ~ upervision or control and the \rork so 
pr<wured to hP done is a part or process in the trade of 
the en1ployer, then ~ueh ~ubcontractor and all persons 
.-tnployPd hy hiu1 are employees, and 'vhere the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the trial court 
t'rrttd in rPfn~ing to direct a verdict for the defendant. 
'rhe conunon law right of ·an employee to ~bring a 
suit \Vas lost 'vith the adoption of the 1917 compensation 
net. Now the employee does not have to prove fault or 
negligence on the part of his employer, and no longer 
(~UJl hP be ~ned by a fellow employee for his own negli~ 
gence. In order \\~ords, our Uta·h Con1pensation act offers 
the etnployee double protection. It is. not unique, and it 
i~ like the con1pensation act of a number of other states. 
ln Oregon 'r orktnen's Cotnp·ensation is the exclu-
sivP re1nedy. In Pruett t·s. Lininger (1960) 224 Ore. 61±, 
356 P. 2d 54 7, "rhere an e1nployee of a general bridge· 
contractor brought a subrogation action against the own-
ers of a crane being rented by his employer to use in 
pouring concrete, and where the evidence sho,ved that 
the operator of the crane 'vas etnployed on an hourly 
ba~i~ and operated the crane under the direction of ·the 
bridge contractor, and where the employee that was in:.. 
jured \\~as guiding a· concrete buCket when a cable from 
"rhich the bucket "~as suspended came in -contact with a 
7,200 volt line, and where the employee received a trau-
nlatic injury and 'vas paid compens·ation· under the Ore-
g-on ,, ... orlonen's Compensation Act, and where the Oregon 
aot provided that ,,~ orkmen's Compensation was the ex..: 
elusive ren1edy against one in the same employment, the 
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0Tegon Sup·reme Court reversed a verdict in favor of 
the employee and against the owners of the crane, saying 
that 'vhere the ·crane operator ·and the employee injured 
were both subject to joint control from the bridge con-
tractor, they were in the same employment, and the in-
jured employee could not umintain an action against the 
owners of the crane ·because the injured man's rights 
were limited by the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
In Idaho in Cloughley vs. Orange Transportation 
Company (1958) 80 Ida. 226, 327 P. 2d 369, where an 
employee and a com·p·ensation carrier brought a similar 
subrogation action as the one in the principal case, where 
the plaintiff was an employee of Detweiler, Inc., and 
where D·etweiler consigned a shipment of boilers to a 
job site via Orange Tran,sportation Company, and where 
Detweiler's superintendent told the driver of Orange 
Transportation ·Company where to place a tractor and 
traile-r while the boHers were being unloaded from the 
trailer, and where Detweiler's superintendent directed 
the plaintiff as to his tasks in unloading the boilers which 
were to be lifted off 'vith a hook and a crane, and where 
it was arranged between the superintendent for Det-
weiler and the driver of Orange Transportation Com-
pany that the driver would drive the truck from under 
the boiler, and "~here the superintendent advised the 
driver that he would station hin1self to the rear of the 
truck, and by means of signals 'vhieh he gave to the 
driver, Park, Park 'vas to observe the signals and move 
the truck forward as directed and stop it in accordance 
with the superintendent's signals, and where the boiler 
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bccatne wedged to the truck and thP boo1n broke on the 
ernne and the plaint iff \Vas injured and paid conlpensa-
uon hy J)('t\vPiler's con1pensation carrier, the Idaho court 
rPVPrsed a jndgtuent for the plaintiff against Orange 
Tran~portation Company, saying: 
"It i ~ elear frotu th~ evidence that it "~as the 
duty of Det\veiler~ Inc., the consignee, to unload 
the boilPrs, and that Det,vPiler, Inc. recognized 
the duty, and actually took charge of it and per-
fortned the unloading operation. Frotn this it fol-
lo\vs that Park, in opPrating the truck during the 
attetnpted unloading, "~as a co-employee or fellow 
servant of plaintiff. K either Park nor his general 
etnployPr, Orange Transportation, were third par-
tiPs against ""hom plaintiff could maintain a tort 
action for datnages under Section 72-204, Idaho 
Code." 
The Idaho Code like the l~tah c·ode, Section 35-1-62, 
provides for subrogation 'vhen the injury shall have 
been caused by the 'vrongful act or neglect of another 
not in the same employment as the injured employee. 
In :Jiassachusetts in 111 cPadden vs. W. J. Halloran 
Contpany (195S) 338 ~lass. 189, 15-± N.E. 2d 582, "~here 
an action \vas brought in the right of an en1ployee of 
Stafford Iron '': orks for the benefit of the plaintiff and 
Stafford's compensation carrier against a contractor of 
Stafford Iron Works ""hich it could have been found 
negligently injured the plaintiff, and ""here it was shown 
~tafford Iron ,, .... orks sold and agreed to install the steel 
Inembers or beruns in a restaurant building, and ,,~here 
Stafford Iron ,.V orks hired Halloran's mobile crane and 
t\vo men to move the fabricated steel members from 
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Stafford's truck, where Stafford did not O\\Tn a crane 
and had no personnel qualified to operate a crane, when· 
Stafford paid an hourly rate for the crane and ''There 
the operator and oiler received their co1npensation fron1 
the crane company, and \vhere Stafford's foreman sup-
ervised the position of the crane, and \Yhere ·Stafford's 
employees signalled the movements of the crane, and 
where Stafford first unloaded steel members to free the 
truck and thereafter, where Stafford's e1nployees \rere 
engaged to disengage the hooks once the steel was in 
place, and where the plaintiff contended the relationship 
\Vas for the jury, the ~Iassachusetts court held in favor 
of the ·defendant crane company as a matter of law say-
ing the employer and the crane o\\~ner \Yere engaged in 
con1mon employment and that the e1nployee "Tho \Vas 
injured when the boom collapsed had no option to sue 
the crane owner at common la\v. 
The very nature of ready-mix concrete makes it ob-
vious that l\Ir. Petersen and 1\lr. Haslam were acting 
under the direction and supervision of the church and 
that they \Vere not free of the church's control in unload-
ing the concrete at a ti1ne and place of their own choos-
ing. The testimony of Frank Cottrell and the appellant 
in his brief adinits that Frank Cottrell, the foreman for 
the church, \Yas the man in charge of the operation. 
Although it appears the trial court could have de-
cided as a matter of law the plaintiff and Hyru1n Peter-
sen were in the same ~1nployment, if it did not do that, 
it should have submitted the question to the jury under 
proper instructions, and it \Veil may be that the trial 
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('o\lrt granted the ne\v trial hPeause it erred in not direct-
ing a verdict for the defendants or in submitting this 
i~suP to the jury as requested (R. 90, 91, 92). 
lt is submitted that if the Supren1e Court concludes 
it has jurisdiction and does not affirm the new trial, then 
it should in~truct the trial court to enter a judg1nent in 
favor of tlH' defendant, dba Acme Crane Rental Coln-
pany, UNo Cause of Action'' as Workmen's Con1pensation 
\rns the plaintiff's exclusive remedy. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FORlVIULATING 
THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES. 
The first question submitted to the jury in the spec-
ial interrogatories (R. 142) 'vas: 
1. ,\ ... as the defendant, Hyrurn Petersen, negligent in 
the placing or operation of the crane immediately before 
or at the actual tirne of the accident in this case~ 
Answer: Yes 
Signed: Lel\ioyne L. Hatch 
Foreman 
The second question asked was : 
~. Did the negligence of Hyrum Petersen proximate-
ly cause, or participate in causing the accident and injury 
of w·hich plaintiff complaints? 
Ans,ver : Yes 
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We clai1n it 'vas error on the part of the court to 
word its questions to the jury in disjunctivt> form. 
On the subject of special interrogatories, it is statPd 
in 53 A~f. J ur. - Trial 1070: 
1070 Generally - '•Special interrogatories should 
be so clear and concise as to be readily understood 
by the jury, and 'vhen practicable each question 
should be so framed as to call for a simple and 
categorical ans,ver. Only such questions as can 
be fairly and definitely answered should be sub-
mitted; interrogatories requiring n1ere specula-
tion or opinion by the jury as to what might or 
might not have been a certain contingency are 
not proper. As a general rule, questions should 
not be framed in the alternative or disjunctive, 
since the answer to a question of such nature 
might not necessarily express the unanimous ver-
dict of the jurors." (Emphasis added) 
Four of the jurors may have thought ~Ir. Petersen 
was negligent in the operation of the crane before the 
accident, and four 1nay have thought he was negligent 
at the time of the accident, or all of them may have 
thought that he was negligent in placing the crane before 
the accident and not negligent in the operation or the 
use of the crane at the time of the accident. On the ques-
tion of causation, the second interrogatory or question 
was also in the disjunctive and does not ans,ver 'vhether 
or not the negligence of I-Iyru1n Petersen proximately 
caused the accident. In ans\\Tering this question, the jur-
ors may have n1erely assu1ned his negligence participated 
in causing the accident, and the ans,ver to this interroga-
tory which was worded in the disjunctive failed to state 
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tht· llP~lip;Pnee of l-lyru1n Petersen \Vas the proxin1ate 
t'aH~e. 
ln Jlurtiu rs. Ebert (194~) 2-!5 'Vis. 341, 13 N.\\'". 2d 
~107 \rhrre the verdict in an action for assault rendered 
in r('~pon~P to a question subtnitted by the court as to 
wht.•ther Pach defendant did participate in, induce, or 
~i Vl' substantial assistanet~ to, or encouragement to others 
in, an assault and battery on plaintiff \vas held invalid, 
~itH'P the question being in the di~junctive, it was im-
po~~ible to detertnine \Vhether all the jury agreed as to 
the Pletnent~ subtnitted or \\·hether some of the1n agreed 
on onP Ph~tuent and others on another element. 
In Boyer 'C~. Gulf, Colorado & Sante Fe Railroad 
CoiHJ)(tny (1957) Tex. Civ. App. 306 S.W. 2d 215 \vhere 
the jury failed to ans\\·er a special interrogatory as to 
\\·hether train crew's failure to discover plight of the 
injured person ,,·as a proxi1nate cause of death of in~ 
jured person, the court held failure to answer the inter-
rogatory \vas not remedied by making an a'vard of 
d~unages. 
The jurors 1uay have thought Hyrum Petersen was 
negligent only before the accident, and they may have 
thought that his negligence participated in causing the 
accident, but that it \\Tas not the proximate cause. The 
ruuended pretrial order (R. 35) sho"\\'"S the plaintiff 
claimed Hyrmn Petersen 'vas negligent in the manner 
in \vhich he operated the crane, and placing or operating 
the crane before the accident, even if negligently done, 
\Vould not support a verdict any n1ore than negligently 
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driving my car last ''"eek would support a verdict in an 
accident at an intersection today. 
With regard to other errors in the special verdict, I 
will not comment for sake of brevity. It is, however, sub-
mitted the trial court correctly concluded that it erred 
in the wording of the special interrogatories, and that it 
properly granted a new trial because the questions asked 
were not clear and concise. 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICALLY IN 
SUBMITTING WANTON OR WILLFUL MISCON-
DUCT TO THE JURY. 
The evidence in this case fails to show that 1\Ir. Pet-
ersen saw the plaintiff "\Vas going to take hold of the 
gabro bucket under the po,verline or that he observed 
that ~Ir. Haslam had parked his truck under the power-
line. It also appears that since the powerline and the 
power pole "\Vas something plain to be seen that he 
would not realize that ~Ir. Haslarn \\"Ould not recognize 
the danger. lVIr. Petersen did not observe Mr. Walker 
and ~:fr. Haslam switch trucks and did not know that 
~Ir. Haslarn had spotted his truck where it was at the 
time he claims to have been injured. 
If J\Ir. Petersen's conduct 'vas reckless or wanton 
Inisconduct, then it is difficult to see "\vhy 1nerely driv-
ing an automobile is not ahvays reckless or wanton mis-
conduct. We have no ll tah cases under this type of fac-
tual situation supporting reckless or wanton misconduct. 
In an automobile case in lJ!lilligan vs. Harward (1960) 11 
Utah :2d 7 4, 355 P. 2d G:2, \\·here the driver, Harward, 'vas 
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eharged \vith "·illful tni:.-;eonduct in tno1nentarily taking 
hi~ PVes off thP road to reach for a cigarette, our court 
" 
snid: 
H lfar\vard's act in reaching for the cigarette 
rannot be construed as \\"illful misconduct. Willful 
mi~conduct is the intentional doing of an act or 
intentional omitting or failing to do an act, ",;ith 
knowledge that serious injury is a probable and 
not tnerely a possible result, or the intentional 
doing of an act with wanton and reckless disre-
gard of the possible consequences. Willful mis-
conduct cannot be predicated upon mere inadver-
tence or even gross negligence." 
~[r. Petersen took his eyes off Mr. "\\.,.. alker's truck 
\rhen he swung the last load of concrete from it around 
in place and did not observe the s"Titch in trucks. If it's 
not \villful misconduct to take your eyes off the road 
to reach for a cigarette, it would seem likewise that it· is 
not wanton or willful misconduct to take your eyes of a 
truck when you are engaged in doing another task. In 
Ricciuti vs. Robbinson (1954) 2 Utah 2d 45, 269 P. 2d 282 
\vhere an action was instituted against the automobile 
driver by a passenger upon the theory the act :of the 
driver in driving 60 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.-h. speed zone 
sho,v·ed willful misconduct, and where the jury returned 
a verdict for the plaintiff, and where thereafter there 
\\·as an appeal, our court defined willful misconduct as 
follows: 
"\V.illful misconduct under our guest statute 
is the intentional doing of an act or intentional 
omitting or. failing to do an act, with knowledge 
that serious injury is a probable and not merely 
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a possible result, or the intentional doing of an 
act with wanton and reckless disregard of the 
possible consequences." 
In Ricciuti vs. Robbinson, supra., the court then said 
even if you assumed the defendant "ras traveling 60 
m.p.h. in a residential zone, that would not indicate the 
defendant had knowledge or any reason to believe that 
speed probably or even possibly would result in a lighted 
cigarette accidentally falling out of his mouth and an 
accident occurring. Such an event just as well could have 
occurred \Vhile driving 25 m.p.h. in any kind of weather 
and in any speed zone. It was not the speed, but the drop-
ping of a lighted cigarette that resulted in the loss of 
control, and this accidental and involuntary circumstance 
cannot be said to be willful misconduct under any reason-
able theory or basis of fact. 
In this case it was Mr. Petersen's failure to see that 
the trucks had been switched and that ~1:r. Haslam had 
not spotted his truck as far southward as ~fr. Walker 
stopped his. This was an accidental and involuntary cir-
cumstance and does not show \villful misconduct or reck-
lessness under any reasonable theory. 
The instruction on recklessness and \villful miscon-
duct was highly prejudicial, as it gave counsel for the 
plaintiff a chance to inflame the jury and argue that 
among all else we were liable because \Ve placed the 
crane \vhere boon1 of it could con1e in contact with the 
po\\rerlines, and thus \\'"e \vere liable because \Ve did not 
have the foresight to foresee that ~[r. Haslam would 
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~top hi~ truek "·hen· hP did. ~~ r. l-iaslan1 \Vas not an in-
vitPP of A<'lllP CranP Rental Cotnpany. 
POINT VIII. 
ON THE QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEG-
LIGENCE, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CON-
CLUDED THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The evidence sho,vs that l\lr. Haslarn had been driv-
ing a ready-1nix ceinPnt truck some seven years prior to 
the ti1ne of the accident, and that he \Yas an experienced 
truck drivPr. II P arrived at the job site about 12 :30 P.M. 
on a cloudy, cold day and had sorne ten or fifteen nlin-
u t P~ in ''" hich to \Vai t and observe all of the hazards and 
problen1~ incident to unloading his truck. However, by 
hi~ o\vn h_·~thnony, he admits that he failed to see the 
po\rPrline and po\ver pole and the hazards involved 
w·hi('h \Vere ite1ns \Vhich he adn1its were plain to be seen, 
and that he did not back his truck into a safe area and 
spot it in a spot as did ~Ir. v\~ alker for unloading. 
In sumn1ary the great "·(Jight of the evidence shows 
that he "·as negligent in not keeping a proper lookout 
for his O\\"n safety at the job site. 
POINT IX. 
TRIAL COURTS HAVE A WIDE LATITUDE IN 
GRANTING NEW TRIALS. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in grant-
ing a ne\\" trial, and in fact, acted properly. In Beck vs. 
Dzdchman Coalition J.llines Co. (1954) 2 Utah 2d 104, 269 
I>. 2d 867, this court said: 
"Trial courts have \vide latitude in granting 
or denying motions for ne\v trials. Considering 
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the evidence "Thich respondent adduced, which 
evidence the jury "\\7as entitled to believe, we can-
not say as a matter of law that the court below 
abused its discretion in denying the Inotion****." 
Likewise, in Bowden vs. Denver & Rio Grande West-
ern Railroad Company (1955) 3 Utah 2d -!44, 286 P. 2d 
240 the court said a trial court has a wide discretion in 
granting or denying motions for a new trial, and that 
the reviewing court will interfere with the exercise there-
of only if there is a clear abuse of discretion. 
In Holmes vs. Nelson (1958) 7 Utah -!35, 326 P. 2d 
722, where the trial judge concluded the evidence 'ras 
insufficient to justify the verdict, this court affirmed 
the granting of a new trial. 
In the case in question, although the jurors received 
a mandatory instruction to a'vard the Third Party Plain-
tiffs a judgment in like amount against the Third Party 
D,efendant as they a'varded the Plaintiff, they arbitrarily 
disregarded this instruction, although they answered a 
complicated set of special interrogatories prior to refus-
ing to follow this instruction, and thereafter, they gave 
Third p·arty Plaintiff the first time they 'Yere sent out 
$100.00 general daamges, and $58.00 in special damages, 
and not until they were sent out the second time did they 
follow the court's instructions. 
Further, the medical testimony sho,Ys that the medi-
cal treatment the plaintiff required follo,ving the acci-
dent was of a minor nature, yet the jurors awarded 
general damages of $50,000.00. Moreover, there was a 
considerable a.rnount of evidence to support a finding of 
44 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
t•ontributory negligencP. On the question of contributory 
rH'gligence, it would seem that in all probability the great 
wl'i~ht of the evidence sho\ved plaintiff was contributor-
ily negligent. The eourt, kno\\~ing the jury disregarded 
tht· instruction on damages and then used the same scale 
of justi('P to \Yeight the evidence on contributory negli-
~PIH'P, had reason to believe the jurors did not fairly 
wl'ight the facts in considering the question of contribu-: 
tory negligence. 
In the trial of this case there were several errors,. 
all of "·hieh had an adverse and prejudicial cumulative 
effeet. In !vic rs. Richa.rdson (1959) 9 Utah 2d 5, 33-6 
P. :!d 781, this court ordered a new trial saying: 
''It is unnecessary and would serve no useful 
purpose for us to decide whether any one of the 
errors above discussed, considered separately, 
\Vould constitute sufficient prejudicial error to 
require a_ new trial. 'The questio:p. is, whether the 
case was presented to the jury in such a manner 
that it is reasonable to believe there was a fair 
and iinpartial analysis of the evidence and a just 
verdict. If errors \vere committed which pre-
vented this from being done; then a new trial 
should be granted, whether it resulted from one 
error, or from several errors cumulatively. We 
expressly do not mean to say that trivia which 
'vould be innocuous in themselves can be ·added 
together to make sufficient error to result in 
prejudice and reversal. The errors must be real 
and substantial and such as may reasonably be· 
supposed \Vould affect the result. However, errors. 
of the latter character, which may not by them-
selves justify a rev_ersal, may well? when consid-
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ered together with others, render it clear that a 
fair trial was not had. In such event justice can 
only be served by the granting of a new trial, 
absent the errors complained of. It is so ordered. 
Costs to appellants." 
IC'ONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly concluded that justice would 
be served only if a new trial were granted because: 
1. Excessive damages appeared to it to have been 
awarded under the influence of passion and prejudice. 
2. The evidence was insufficient to justify the ver-
dict, and the verdict was against the law. 
3. It erred in instructing the jury and formulating 
the questions submitted as special interrogatories. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND M. BERRY 
203 Executive Building 
455 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents 
Paulsen, dba Acme Crane 
Rental Company 
I hereby certify that on this __________ day of November, 
1963, I mailed two copies of this Brief by United States 
Mail, postage prepaid to A. Park Smoot; t\vo copies to 
George H. Searle; and t'vo copies to Skeen, Worsley, 
Snow and Christensen at the address sho,vn on this Brief . 
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